In the context of claims that the European Aviation Safety Agency's flight and duty-time regulations pose a threat to safety, pilot workload and fatigue were assessed on two short-haul routes using a mixed-methods approach. Data produced by the US Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine Crew Status Survey (CSS) showed that pilots rarely assessed workload and fatigue to be high-risk. Data produced by an ethnographic study somewhat contradicted the CSS findings, with some pilots claiming to be fatigued. The combined data suggested a correlation between both workload and fatigue and aviation system dynamics such as airspace manoeuvring restrictions, especially in the vicinity of busy airports. The research presented an opportunity to test claims made for the CSS, specifically that it is 'easily understood, easy to administer and minimally intrusive'. Missing forms and errors suggest that it is not as reliable a research instrument as proponents suggest, although contextual factors may have served to reduce the volume and quality of data. It is concluded that a pre-survey, systems-thinking-informed evaluation of the host airline would suggest ways of improving buy-in.
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The research Conducted over two periods (14 June-31 July 2015, and 1 September-16 October, 2015) , the research asked pilots to self-assess workload and fatigue on two commercial air routes, Birmingham, UK, to Niece (BHX-NCE-BHX) and Birmingham, UK, to Palma (BHX-PMI-BHX). To avoid overburdening pilots on these potentially high-workload routes, a simple research instrument was required. Charlton's (2008, 109-112) claims for the US Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine Crew Status Survey (CSS) prompted its selection: '[The CSS] was designed to be easily understood by the test participants, easy to administer and complete in the field … The survey can be completed very quickly … and thus produces little disruption'. To understand the reality of operating the routes the author made 12 jump-seat observation flights 1 (a total of 24 sectors) during which he took notes and encouraged flight crew to complete the CSS (renamed the Workload-and-Fatigue Record, abbreviated to WorkFat).
In the context of claims that the European Aviation Safety Agency's (EASA's) flight and duty-time regulations pose a threat to flight safety (Bennett 2014) , and of the proliferation of work-intensive short-haul routes, the research assessed levels of flight crew workload and fatigue on two intra-European routes. As the research unfolded, the opportunity arose to test Charlton's claims for the CSS, which is critiqued in the tradition of reflective practice (Dewey 1933; Schön 1983; Bolton 2010) .
The degree to which workload affects performance is unclear (Hockey 2002) . Impact is mediated by knowledge, experience, innate ability, fatigue, environmental conditions, required standards and other factors (Maurino et al. 1998; Campbell and Bagshaw 1999; Dekker 2007) . It is possible that overburdened pilots may lose situation awareness. They may obsess about relatively unimportant matters (coning of attention). In a laboratory experiment with young, low-hours (10-300 h flight-time) student pilots, Morris and Leung (2006, 1595) noted 'high prioritisation error rates associated with increased mental workloads'. They also found that 'medium and high mental workload environments severely impacted on an individual's ability to listen [to] , comprehend and respond to auditory messages' [my emphasis] (Morris and Leung 2006, 1595) . Green et al. (1996, 46-47) note: 'At extremely high levels of workload (overload), important information may be missed, due to the narrowing or focusing of attention onto only one aspect of the task'.
Those subjected to high workloads may experience temporal distortion (a few minutes may seem like hours and an hour may seem like a few minutes) (Smith 2012) . They may revert to learned behaviours inappropriate to their current situation:
[U]nder stress, behaviour may regress to the earliest learnt, such as operating a control or selector in a manner which would have been appropriate to the previous type of aircraft flown, but not the current one. (Campbell and Bagshaw 1999, 134) While pilots train for high-workload, high-stress episodes, simulation can only approximate reality. Dekker (2007, 6) argues that pilots' foreknowledge of the simulation session's adverse event '[makes] the unexpected less unexpected'. He asks: How good a test is an expected, unexpected event? The link between fatigue and performance is better understood. Fatigue provokes error (Battelle Memorial Institute 1998; Campbell and Bagshaw 1999; Rhodes and Gil 2002) .
The operational context
The research was conducted at a medium-sized UK-registered airline that operated Airbus single-aisle aircraft (A320s and A321s) over short-and medium-haul routes. The airline had implemented EASA's new flight and duty-time regulations a few months before the research commenced. Although financial difficulties in 2014 and a subsequent change of ownership may have affected morale, no Captain refused the author access. Bennett (2003) notes that pilots welcome opportunities to unburden. Two short, potentially high-workload routes were surveyed. Normally, crews operating the routes flew no more than two sectors per day.
3 At BHX, a seven -day run of duties was possible. 4 Pilots operating the two routes could be rostered multiple consecutive early starts. One pilot, rostered on the early BHX-PMI-BHX for a fifth consecutive day, noted on his WorkFat form: 'Fifth very early report in a row. Woke up on alarm at 03:30z. [Yesterday's] Madeira had been challenging. Felt OK, so decided to operate the flight. Cumulative fatigue kicking in as flight progressed'. His final WorkFat comment was: 'Nothing missed, but had to confirm calls and checks, as could not remember if done' (see PN13, below).
5 His subjective fatigue ratings were as follows:
The scheduled flight times for the two routes during the research period were:
The author's jump-seat observations confirmed that actual flight times were usually less than scheduled flight times, and that turnarounds were usually accomplished in less than an hour. (At the subject airline, contractors cleaned the aircraft at turnaround. Other carriers flying the same routes required cabin and flight crew to clean the aircraft). On the flights where accurate turnaround timings were taken, it took an average of 59 min to turn an aircraft around. The ethnographic data showed that aircraft arrived back at BHX more or less on schedule.
The WorkFat form allowed pilots to note the day they performed the flight out of a run of days. For example, if the flight was performed on day two out of a four -day run, it would be recorded as 2/4. The following 1  2  2  2  3  5  8  3  3  6  8  1 7  4  4  5  1 1  8  2 8  5  5  7  7  6  8  3 3  6  0  2  2  1  2  5  1 2  7  1  1  Total  17  25  28  15  10  5 1
Journal of Risk Research
Day number data was recorded on 101 of the 110 forms submitted. The largest number of forms were completed by pilots on day three of a four-day run (11 forms). Five-day runs were most prevalent. Twelve forms were completed by pilots who had been rostered a six-day run. One pilot (a management pilot, specifically the Base Captain) was on day seven of a seven-day run. He wrote: 'Day seven of seven. Earlies onto lates' (N4). His subjective fatigue ratings for his day 7 NCE were:
Research method and instruments An inductive approach was used. With reference to Bogdan and Taylor's (1975) , Berger and Mohr's (2010) , 6 Gilbert's (1993), Harvey and MacDonald's (1993) and Burns's (2000) discourses on ethnography, oral history and subjectivity, by mixing data generated by instantaneous self-assessment (ISA) (the WorkFat form recorded workload, fatigue and narrative data) with data gleaned from third-party observations (the author's jump-seat rides that allowed him to observe the operation and talk with flight crew), the research generated quantitative and qualitative insights into the flight-deck labour process. Pickup et al. (2005) claim that observations made by human factors specialists provide useful insights.
Regarding the choice of research instrument (WorkFat), while other human factors ISA research instruments are available, for example, NASA's Task Load Index (TLX), the Subjective Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT), and the Workload Profile (WP) (Hart and Staveland 1988; Rubio et al. 2004 • Maximum workload (a circled number)
• Average workload (a crossed number)
• Fatigue (a circled number)
The form provided space for comments, pilots being encouraged to make observations with this exhortation: 'Please make a note of diverts. Roster information is also useful.'
WorkFat's seven-point workload and fatigue scales carried the following descriptors:
Workload scale
Fatigue scale
As per the colour codings, responses were grouped to facilitate analysis. A traffic-light pattern (green, amber, red) was used: Green = low risk; Amber = medium risk; Red = high risk. The diary kept by the observer is shown at Figure 1 .
In summary, the quantitative and qualitative (ethnographic) data created a high-fidelity account of the flight-deck labour process at a single airline on two intra-European routes during the summer/autumn season (generally a busy time for an airline). There are relatively few ethnographic accounts of commercial aviation operations. Bennett's (2003 Bennett's ( , 2006a Bennett's ( ,b, 2010 Bennett's ( , 2014 ), Ginnett's (1990) , Haertner's (2011) and Helmreich and Merritt's (1998) accounts are the exception. A reflexive commentary on the research method Reflective practice (Dewey 1933; Schön 1983; Bolton 2010 ) encourages transparency:
• The research builds on earlier work, a common approach in the social sciences (Gilbert 1993 ).
• There is disagreement as to whether ISA accurately measures fatigue and stress (Pickup et al. 2005; Baron 2009; Caldwell et al. 2009; Eurocontrol 2012 ).
• Because meaning is actively constructed (Bartlett 1932; Bruner 1986; Vygotsky and Kozulin 1986) , 8 it is possible that the meanings ascribed by pilots to the WorkFat form's descriptors of loading and physical states differed.
• Funding and time constraints, plus the author's desire not to overstress a pilot community that had faced the possibility of redundancy 9 meant that two routes were surveyed.
• The number of WorkFat forms returned was less than the number of services to NCE and PMI during the two research periods. A total of 132 company services were flown to NCE and PMI. One hundred and ten forms were returned, 10 a completion rate of 83%. 11 The author's presence on the flightdeck did not guarantee that WorkFat forms would be completed. 
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• Despite efforts to show pilots how the forms should be completed (for example, by asking that the 'model WorkFat form' (see Figure 2 ) be circulated), only 34 forms were completed 100% correctly.
Problems included (and see Figures 3 and 4):
• No data entered for elements of the flight (e.g. Boarding to Off Blocks).
• A form being completed for just one leg (just the outbound leg, or just the inbound leg).
• The Average Workload symbol (a crossed number) being confused with the Maximum Workload symbol (a circled number), despite a key being printed on every form.
• Circling a single number on the Workload scale. Did the pilot intend this to signify maximum, or average workload? • Circling two numbers. In cases where it was unclear which number the pilot intended as her/his answer, the lower value was recorded (giving the data a conservative bias).
• Despite encouraging pilots to use the Comments boxes to provide contextual information (for example, the duration and quality of pre-report sleep), few did so. 
Analysis
The data shows that pilots rarely assessed workload and fatigue to be 'high-risk' (defined here as scores 5-7 for workload, and scores 6-7 for fatigue). Having said this, two returns stand out: 12.4% of those who completed the inbound Top-ofClimb -Top-of-Descent scale claimed to be either 'Extremely tired' or 'Completely exhausted'; 13.7% of those who completed the inbound Top-of-Descent -OnBlocks scale claimed to be either 'Extremely tired' or 'Completely exhausted'. 
13.7 (13) The ethnographic data illustrates the practical consequences of sleep loss and (perceived) fatigue. After operating two High Season (June) earlies out of Gatwick, a pilot on day three of five noted of his BHX-PMI-BHX: 'Yesterday was very tiring. Roster is LGW for two earlies. Early Dalaman, then LGW-PMI. Back to BHX straight afterwards, to do three more earlies. Waking up between 03:00 and 04:00 to report on-time for each. I was rostered BHX-DLM today (day three of five) but spoke to crewing to move to a shorter flight … Still unsure whether I will be able to manage all five earlies. Generally getting six hours sleep each night, so after five I am in ten hours sleep debt. Always feel a low on return sector of an early start. I struggle to keep my eyes open. I made a lot of stupid mistakes yesterday, saying the wrong words, or just doing the wrong thing'.
16 His self-assessed fatigue level on the outbound leg (BHX-PMI) was consistently 4, and on the inbound leg consistently 5.
A pilot on day six of six noted of his BHX-PMI-BHX early departure: 'More tired than usual. Am having to double-check actions. Day six, of six earlies. Very early departures [woke at 01:55z for scheduled 05:10z departure]'. His self-assessed fatigue level on the return leg was consistently 5. The mind and body are at their least efficient during the circadian low (approximately 03:00-06:00) (Rhodes and Gil 2002) . Sleep debt has cognitive impacts:
Lack of sleep … will quickly result in mental fatigue. You become increasingly inattentive while trying to concentrate on your tasks. As fatigue increases, your short-term memory becomes less effective and you may forget vital information. Your creativity and decision-making abilities start to wane and you have more difficulty dealing with novel situations. (Rhodes and Gil 2002, 20) By way of comparison, a management pilot on day seven of seven operating BHX-NCE during High Season (July) assessed his fatigue at 2-3 for most elements and 4 for Off-blocks -Top-of-climb. Sleep requirements and stress tolerances vary (Green et al. 1996; Campbell and Bagshaw 1999; Dekker 2007; Caldwell et al. 2009 ). Dekker (2007, 6 ) notes of subjects' reactions to stress: 'Not everybody experiences the same situation in the same way. It depends on experience, proficiency, time of day, familiarity, disposition and so on. ' Caldwell et al. (2009, 52) note of subjects' reactions to fatigue: ' [T] here are wide individual differences in fatigue susceptibility'.
The data shows that pilots consistently assessed fatigue types 4 and 5 (a little tired/moderately tired) to be more prevalent on the inbound sector. The ethnographic study showed that aircraft approaching BHX can be kept high by ATC, necessitating a rapid, high-workload descent. Scores of 5-7 for Maximum Workload, 5-7 for Average Workload and 3-4 for Average Workload were seen most often for the descent into BHX. These findings resonate with Lee's (2010, ii) TLX-informed research into pilot workload and stress: 'Five students and five instructor pilots from EmbryRiddle Aeronautical University … participated … [T]hey flew under four different simulation tasks of gliding angle and approach area. Their Heart Rate Variability and TLX were measured to determine their stress level and subjective workload, respectively'. Lee's data revealed a positive correlation between flying operations over populated areas and pilot workload and stress. It also revealed a positive correlation between angle of descent and pilot workload and stress. Lee gathered human factors data from two descent profiles: a 3.0 degree approach and a 4.5 degree approach: 'During the flight with 4.5 degree [sic] , the pilots showed lower performance with higher workload and stress' (Lee 2010, iii) .
The data shows that pilots associated maximum workload with flight-phases Boarding -Off-blocks and Top-of-descent -On-blocks. The ethnographic study showed how programming the flight-management computer, reviewing the Technical Log, fuelling, general form-filling (completing manual load sheets and signing-off the fuel uplift, for example), technical faults like defective auxiliary power units (see PN14), no-show passengers and the need to offload bags increased pilots' workload prior to push-back. The ethnographic data revealed how circumstance could impact workload, as with the First Officer left to set the aircraft up on his own because his Captain was delayed by traffic. The Captain arrived on the flight-deck ten minutes before push-back. It was not until the aircraft was in the climb that the Captain became fully situation-aware (see N5). Viewed through a LOSA prism, poor situationawareness is a potential threat to safety.
The data shows that pilots assessed fatigue types 4 and 5 (a little tired/moderately tired) to be more prevalent as the duty unfolded. This suggests a positive relationship between elapsed flight duty time and fatigue types 4 and 5. Powell et al. (2007) note a linear relationship between duty length and fatigue. Pilots scored the cruise portion of the flight (Top-of-Climb -Top-of-Descent) as having the lightest workload, with the inbound cruise portion of the flight having the lowest workload. The ethnographic study showed that pilots completed a variety of duty paperwork on the outbound sector. This may explain why some pilots delayed completing their WorkFat form until the aircraft was in the cruise on the return leg (see, for example, P3). One pilot commented: 'Too busy to fill this form in on the outbound sector, so I filled it in retrospectively' (NN4).
The 83% completion rate and 69% error rate 18 suggest that claims made for the CSS -for example, that it is 'easily understood' and 'easy to complete in the field' -merit scrutiny. Viewed through a systems-thinking (Perrow 1983; Reason 2013; Dekker 2014; Waterson and Catchpole 2015) lens, take-up and quality may have been influenced by:
• morale • preoccupations (for example, job security, changes in terms and conditions)
• perceptions of management-sanctioned academic research • inertia induced by an embedded flight-deck modus operandi • a desire to meet on-time performance (OTP) targets that meant WorkFat was given a relatively low priority (see PN8) • the lived reality of a work environment where safety is paramount and the mantra 'aviate, navigate, communicate' orders flight-deck activity (Morris and Leung 2006) .
Findings suggest that claims made for other human factors ISA instruments merit scrutiny. Rubio et al. (2004) evaluated three human factors ISA instruments: TLX, the SWAT and the WP against six criteria: intrusiveness; sensitivity; convergent validity; concurrent validity; diagnosticity; and implementation requirements and acceptability. The success with which each instrument satisfied the six criteria varied. For example, in regard to the success with which the final criteria (implementation requirements and acceptability) was satisfied, the authors comment: 'Subjects accepted willingly the three instruments, although there were some problems concerning comprehension of the dimensions in the WP. As for the SWAT, the ranking task prior to the performance of the experimental tasks proved wearisome' (Rubio et al. 2004, 83) . The authors conclude with an appeal for further refinement of TLX, the SWAT and the WP, and development of new research instruments:
[W]e want to emphasise the need for continued research in subjective mental workload that serves to develop better human information processing models, to design new measure procedures, and to improve the properties of the existing assessment instruments. (Rubio et al. 2004, 83) To summarise: while the CSS research instrument may harbour weaknesses and lacunae, so might the TLX, SWAT and WP research instruments (and, one suspects, other human factors data-gathering instruments, too).
The ethnographic study showed flight phases Boarding -Off-blocks and Offblocks -Top of climb to be generally busy and demanding, with the latter phase especially so. Actions during critical phases of flight like Off-blocks -Top-of-climb are dictated by the nature of the activity (taxiing an aircraft through a busy and complex ground environment, then taking it safely into the air). Both the pilot flying (PF) and pilot monitoring (PM) are required to respond to routine demands (steering the aircraft and actioning ATC instructions, for example), solve expected and unexpected problems (threats) 19 and trap and correct errors. Flight deck activities are further shaped by processes of routinisation, standardisation and prescription. 'Much of the human work on a flight deck is prescribed' note Wright, Pocock, and Fields (1998, 1). The 83% return rate and 69% error rate suggest it can be difficult to introduce additional routines into a demanding environment -even minimally intrusive routines like completing Likert scales for workload and fatigue. Initiatives may be frustrated by praxis (Schermerhorn, Hunt, and Osborn 2005) . Further, the organisational context was not conducive to additional demands. The ethnographic study revealed cynicism and low morale amongst some pilots. 20 It is reasonable to assume that this background affected the response. Initiatives may be frustrated by circumstance (Schermerhorn, Hunt, and Osborn 2005) .
Conclusions
The data suggests that, contrary to expectations, EASA's flight and duty -time regulations are not inducing dangerous levels of fatigue (as self-assessed by pilots). Having said this, the results should be treated with caution. Reasons include:
• Only two routes from a single base were surveyed. Consequently, the data may be unrepresentative.
• The operation is not representative of the industry as a whole. Pilots do not routinely operate four sector days. 21 Powell et al. (2007, 701) The data suggests that on the two routes surveyed, workload was generally not considered excessive. The ethnographic study showed how factors beyond the control of the pilots (for example, slots, 22 missing passengers, technical faults, flight-deck interruptions, inadequate ground-handling resources, procedures and skills 23 and airspace manoeuvring restrictions) conspired to increase workload. Seen through the LOSA prism, such events are potential threats to safety and efficiency. Finally, the data suggests that claims made for the functionality and workplace acceptability of the CSS are open to question. Having said this, the research was conducted under less-than-ideal circumstances. Buy-in can be improved by tailoring methodology to circumstance. The systems-thinking prism can help reveal obstacles to research.
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Amongst other things, a visual approach involves disconnecting the Autopilot and clearing the Flight Director command bars. The objective is to land using visual references only (Flight Safety Foundation 2000) . 25. The FO ceded control without being ordered to. Green et al. (1996, 105) 
N3 July
The Captain and FO had not flown together before. The Captain was answering a request to do the flight after flying three early departures (hence 4/3). Had it been a longer duty, he said he would have declined the request. The flight-deck carried two additional persons, the author, and a cabin crewmember on a familiarisation flight. Pushed-back 14:31z on a STD of 13:55. 
N9 October
The Captain and FO had flown together before. However, they had not flown together for some months. FO was PF on first leg. Pushed back 13:47z on a STD of 13:55. 'Run of five earlies, now five lates (one disruption day between early run and late run) …. 
